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ABSTRACT
As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is
important to understand the factors that influence whether foreign outside investors provide capital
to a country’s firms. This study examines whether and why investor concern about corporate
governance results in fewer foreign holdings. We use a comprehensive set of foreign holdings by
U.S. investors as a proxy for foreign investment and analyze a sample of 4,411 firms from 29
emerging market and developed economies. We find that foreigners invest significantly less in firms
that are poorly governed, i.e., firms that have ownership structures that are more conducive to outside
investor expropriation. Interestingly, this finding is not simply a matter of a country’s economic
development but appears to be directly related to a country’s information rules and legal institutions.
We therefore argue that information problems faced by foreign investors play an important role in
this result. Supporting this explanation, we show that foreign investment is lower in firms that appear
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warnockf@darden.virginia.edu“The fundamental issue for everyone involved in financial markets today, regardless of company 
or country, must be to maintain high standards – legal, regulatory, and ethical – that breed trust 
and confidence. ….. Capital will flee environments that are unstable or unpredictable – whether 
that' s  a  function  of  lax  corporate  governance,  ineffective  accounting  standards,  a  lack  of 
transparency, or a weak enforcement regime. Investors must see for themselves that companies 
are living up to their obligations and embracing the spirit underpinning all securities laws.” 





Domestic  sources  of  outside  finance  are  limited  in  many  countries  around the  world 
[Giannetti and Koskinen (2004)].  In response, many capital markets have been liberalized, and 
foreign capital has become an increasingly important source of finance, particularly for firms 
from emerging markets [Karolyi (1998)].  For instance, in the mid-1990s Asian firms raised $1 
in foreign equity markets for every $3 they raised domestically [Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine 
(2002)].  Given the growing significance of foreign financing, and the fact that access to foreign 
capital may well be uneven across firms and countries, it is important to understand more fully 
the factors that can cause investors to shy away from providing capital to foreign firms. 
Poor firm-level corporate governance is one factor that draws considerable attention from 
outside investors and regulators, but has rarely been investigated in large-scale academic studies.  
Institutional investors frequently claim that they avoid foreign firms that are poorly governed, 
particularly when it comes to investments in emerging markets.
1  Similarly, as the quote above 
makes  clear,  government  officials  and  securities  regulators  often  express  concerns  that  poor 
governance hinders foreign investment and may thus impede financial development.  However, 
outside  investors  that  fear  governance  problems  and  expropriation  by  insiders  are  likely  to 
                                                       
1 A 2002 McKinsey and Company global investor survey shows that corporate governance considerations dominate 
decisions about which firms in Latin American and East Asia receive investment whereas for North American firms 
financial statement considerations dominate.  The survey also reports that “more than 60% of investors state that 
governance considerations might lead them to avoid individual companies with poor governance.”  Similarly, when 
discussing investment criteria, the long-time manager of the $1.2 billion Templeton Developing Markets Trust, 
Mark Mobius, states that “corporate governance is not improving, so why fight it?” [Karmin (2000)].  
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reduce the price they are willing to pay for a firm’s shares.  As a result of price protection, even 
poorly governed firms should offer an adequate return, raising the questions of whether and why 
governance concerns could manifest themselves in fewer foreign holdings. 
Our study is an attempt to shed some light on these questions examining a sample of 
4,411 firms from 29 countries in which U.S investors are the “foreign” investors.  We show that 
U.S. investors, which comprise about half of all foreign investment worldwide, do in fact hold 
fewer shares in non-U.S. firms with ownership structures that are more conducive to governance 
problems and expropriation by controlling insiders.  We also provide evidence that information 
problems faced by U.S. investors play a central role in this result. 
It is commonly argued that foreign investors are at an informational disadvantage relative 
to local investors [Brennan and Cao (1997), Kang and Stulz (1997), and Choe, Kho, and Stulz 
(2005)].    In  this  paper,  we  argue  that  information  asymmetries  between  foreign  and  local 
investors  are  particularly  pronounced  with  respect  to  the  evaluation  of  a  firm’s  governance 
structures.  In many countries – constituting both emerging and developed markets – business 
transactions, financing arrangements, and, ultimately, corporate governance are shaped not by 
arm’s length dealings, but by relationships among a tightly knit group of controlling families and 
managers.  Understanding these insider relationships (and their implications for outside investor 
expropriation)  requires  an  intricate  social  knowledge  of  political  connections,  banking 
connections, private gatherings of the business elite, and so forth, which foreigners are less likely 
to have.  Additionally, it seems plausible that foreign investors are more likely to shy away from 
particular firms with expected insider expropriation problems when a country’s governance and 
information regulations are relatively weak, because poor country-level institutions make the 
evaluation of firms’ governance structures more important and costly.  
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These  information  asymmetries  can  influence  the  investment  decisions  of  foreign 
investors in two ways.  First, they give rise to an adverse selection problem when investors 
transact  in  foreign  markets  [Akerlof  (1970)  and  Milgrom  (1981)].
2    As  a  result,  investors 
underinvest in foreign stocks because they do not expect to receive a fair return based on the 
prices at which locals would transact.  Consistent with this reasoning, Choe, Kho, and Stulz 
(2005) find that for Korean stocks prices move more against foreign investors than domestic 
investors before trades.  Second, once an investment is made, firms with suspect governance 
structures  require  more  monitoring  than  well-governed  firms  and,  based  on  our  preceding 
arguments, this is likely to be more costly for foreign investors.  In addition, poorly governed 
firms often actively hide the extent of their governance problems and expropriation activities, for 
instance, by providing opaque financial statements and managing earnings [e.g., Fan and Wong 
(2002)  and  Leuz,  Nanda  and  Wysocki  (2003)].    Again,  local  investors  are  probably  better 
equipped to unravel these activities, resulting in lower monitoring costs. 
Stulz (1981) shows in an equilibrium model that out-of-pocket costs incurred in holding 
foreign assets can induce investors to underweight foreign securities.  While Stulz (1981) models 
these costs as a tax that equally affects all foreign holdings of domestic investors, his basic 
insight can be extended to the situation we describe above, in which information costs related to 
governance differ across investors, firms, and markets [see Cooper and Kaplanis (1986, 2000) 
for such model extensions].  These papers form the theoretical basis of our argument that, in 
capital market equilibrium, governance structures that are particularly taxing with respect to their 
information and monitoring costs can manifest themselves in lower foreign holdings. 
                                                       
2  The fundamental problem is very similar to the one that motivates bid ask spreads and price impact of trades in the 
market microstructure literature.  See, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985).  
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As there can be a host of reasons why foreign investors avoid or seek stocks from a 
particular  country,  such  as  the  degree  of  market  integration,  benefits  from  diversification, 
transaction costs, restrictions on capital flows, proximity to the home country, and language, we 
control for country-fixed effects in our tests  That is, we analyze which stocks U.S. investors 
choose within a given country, focusing on ownership structures that are more conducive to 
governance problems and expropriation of outside investors. 
We  obtain  U.S.  holdings  by  merging  comprehensive  security-level  data  on  all  U.S. 
investors’ positions in non-U.S. equities from the 1997 U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board 
benchmark survey.  We identify poor firm-level governance by constructing both nominal and 
relative proxies indicating that managers and their families are, in effect, in control of their firms.  
As managers and families generally obtain control by owning far less than 100% of a firm’s cash 
flow rights, controlling insiders have not only the ability but also the incentive to expropriate 
outside investors [Jensen and Meckling (1976)  and  La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(hereafter LLS) (1999)].
3  We obtain our ownership and control data from Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang (2000) (Japan), Faccio and Lang (2002) (Western Europe), and Lins (2003) (emerging 
markets) and combine these datasets in a consistent fashion. 
Across all countries, we find that firm-level proxies for governance problems and private 
control benefits have a negative relation to U.S. investment, but the result is relatively weak in 
terms  of  both  economic  and  statistical  significance.    We  next  analyze  the  effect  of  poor 
governance on U.S. holdings within emerging market economies because it is often argued that 
access to foreign capital is particularly important for these firms and for these economies overall 
[Henry (2000), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001, 2005)].   We find that firm-level proxies 
                                                       
3 Supporting this hypothesis, Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Lins (2003) 
show that in emerging markets high levels of managerial and family control are costly to non-controlling or outside 
shareholders.  
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for governance and expropriation problems are unrelated to U.S. holdings in this context.  While 
seemingly surprising, the classification of countries as “emerging markets” based on per-capita 
GDP does not account for the substantial variation in countries’ institutional structures.  There 
are developed market countries, such as Italy, for which Zingales (1994) provides evidence that 
opaque reallocations of assets to favor connected insiders at the expense of minority shareholders 
are easily tolerated within the country’s institutional and political framework.  In contrast, there 
are emerging markets such as Hong Kong that have relatively comprehensive and well-enforced 
disclosure requirements, such as those on related party transactions as documented by Cheung, 
Rau, and Stouraitis (2005).  Similarly, a country’s domestic supply of arm’s-length finance is not 
simply a function of its economic development.  In Germany, one of the largest economies in the 
world, finance has traditionally been more relational than arm’s length. 
We expect the governance effect on holdings to be more pronounced in countries whose 
institutional  structures  exacerbate  the  information  problems  faced  by  foreign  investors.    To 
examine this hypothesis, we conduct tests that estimate the governance effect on foreign holdings 
separately for countries with low and high scores for measures from LLS (2004) that capture a 
country’s disclosure regulation and outside investor protection.  Our results indicate that weak 
country-level disclosure and governance, rather than a country’s GDP-per-capita, makes firm-
level governance an important determinant of foreign investment.  U.S. investors significantly 
underweight firms with high levels of managerial and family control when they are domiciled in 
countries with weaker disclosure requirements, securities regulations, and outside shareholder 
rights, or domiciled in countries with a non-English legal origin, which is often argued to be a 
summary measure for a number of institutional features.  In contrast, within extensive-disclosure  
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and strong-governance countries, firms with high levels of managerial and family control do not 
experience less foreign investment. 
These results are consistent with an interpretation that information problems faced by 
foreign investors for firms with poor firm-level governance play an important role in investment 
choices.    Stringent  disclosure  requirements  make  it  less  costly  to  become  informed  about 
potential governance problems and they also level the playing field among investors so it is less 
likely  that  locals  have  an  information  advantage.    Strongly  enforced  minority  shareholder 
protection  reduces  the  consumption  of  private  benefits  of  control  and  thus  decreases  the 
importance  of  information  regarding  these  private  benefits.    In  contrast,  low  disclosure 
requirements and weak investor protection exacerbate information problems. 
An alternative and potentially more direct way to test whether information problems are 
at the core of our holdings results is to use proxies for poor information flows instead of our 
governance variables.  Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) and Haw, Hu, Hwang, and Wu (2004) 
show that earnings management is more pervasive in countries with weak investor protection, 
and in firms where insiders are more likely to consume private control benefits.  These findings 
support the notion that information flows to outside investors are particularly poor for firms with 
weak governance.  Thus, we replace our firm-level governance variables with firm-level earnings 
management  proxies  and  re-estimate  our  models  to  see  whether  these  proxies  yield  similar 
results.  Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that foreign holdings  of U.S. investors are 
negatively related to the presence of firm-level earnings management in countries with weak 
disclosure requirements, securities regulation and outside shareholder protection.  This finding 
sheds some light on the mechanism behind our earlier results and lends further credence to the 
notion that information problems associated with poor governance deter foreign investment.  
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Our  paper  has  two  main  contributions.   First, we  are  the  first  to provide compelling 
evidence for a large sample across many countries that foreigners do indeed invest less in poorly 
governed firms.  As discussed in more detail in the next section, prior studies are limited by their 
samples and have produced mixed results.  Second, we take the analysis a step further and show 
that the governance effect on foreign holdings owes at least in part to information problems.  
This  conclusion  is  supported  by  the  finding  that  the  foreign  holding  effects  are  particularly 
pronounced  for  poorly  governed  firms  in  countries  with  weak  governance  and  disclosure 
regulation, and the finding that foreign holdings are negatively associated with higher levels of 
earnings management in weak governance and disclosure countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the empirical 
literature  on  international  portfolio  holdings,  particularly  as  it  relates  to  information  and 
governance problems.  Section 3 describes our data and sample selection.  Section 4 presents the 
empirical findings.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Discussion of Prior Findings 
Prior studies on corporate governance and foreign investment can be divided into those 
based on aggregate, country-level portfolio data and those that utilize firm-level data.  Country-
level results are somewhat mixed.  Both Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2004) and Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, and Williamson (hereafter DPSW) (2003) study a combination of emerging and developed 
market countries and find that of a battery of country-level governance variables, only a proxy 
for  government  expropriation  risk  matters.
4    However,  the  two  studies  obtain  the  opposite 
results; international investors prefer countries with a lower government expropriation risk in 
                                                       
4 Overall, DPSW conclude that ‘for a given supply of shares, U.S. investors do not invest less in a country because 
minority shareholders are less well protected or because laws are not enforced’ (page 104).  
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DPSW, but avoid such countries in Chan et al.  In contrast to the Chan et al. finding, Giannetti 
and Koskinen (2004), using the same source data on holdings, find that funds put a larger share 
of their assets in countries with better scores for private enforcement of investor rights.  Two 
related studies focus exclusively on emerging markets.  Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005) 
find  that  U.S.  mutual  funds  overweight  emerging  markets  that  have  stronger  accounting 
standards, shareholder rights and legal frameworks, and Gelos and Wei (2005) find that less 
opaque emerging market countries have greater weights in mutual funds’ portfolios. 
Firm-level results are also mixed.  To our knowledge, tests that incorporate firm-level 
governance proxies obtained from ownership structures have been conducted only for Sweden 
and  show  conflicting  results.    DPSW  find  no  evidence  that  firm-level  ownership  matters  to 
foreign investors, whereas Giannetti and Simonov (2006) find that foreign investors are less 
likely to invest when a firm’s controlling shareholders have greater incentives to expropriate 
outside investors.  It can be argued that another firm-level indicator of strong governance is the 
presence of a U.S. exchange listing (see, among others,  Foerster and  Karolyi  (1999), Miller 
(1999), Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), and Doidge, Karolyi, 
Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2005)), although this event occurs for only a very small percentage of all 
publicly  traded  non-U.S.  firms.    Ammer,  Holland,  Smith,  and  Warnock  (2004),  Bradshaw, 
Bushee, and Miller (2004), Edison and Warnock (2004), and Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki 
(2005) find that a U.S. listing is associated with a substantial increase in foreign investment.
5   
While extant country-level regressions such as DPSW (2003) do not find a link between 
governance and foreign investment once a firm’s free float is controlled for, these findings do not 
necessarily imply that such a link does not exist.  It is possible that foreign investors overweight 
                                                       
5 Cross listing is also argued to proxy for both an international presence and a lessening of direct and indirect 
barriers  to  international  investment  (Pagano,  Roell,  and  Zechner  (2002),  Claessens,  Klingebiel,  and  Schmukler 
(2003), and Sarkissian and Schill (2004)), both of which should contribute to increases in foreign holdings.  
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firms for which governance is expected to be strong (e.g., those with U.S. cross listings) and 
underweight firms with weak governance, resulting in no effect in the aggregate.  Alternatively, 
the country-level governance measures used in previous work could be too coarse to pick up the 
effect.  One reason why previous studies using firm-level governance variables yield inconsistent 
results could be the fact that they have been conducted for Sweden – a country with relatively 
strong  governance  [DPSW  (2003)  and  Giannetti  and  Simonov  (2006)].    Strong  external 
governance is known to lessen the impact of potential firm-level governance problems [Lins 
(2003),  Nenova  (2003),  Doidge  (2004),  Dyck  and  Zingales  (2004),  and  Klapper  and  Love 
(2004)].
6  Thus, a more thorough understanding of corporate governance and foreign investment 
calls for tests that discriminate, within country, based on firm-level governance parameters and 
do so for a wide range of countries to exploit country-level variation in corporate governance.  
We conduct such tests in this paper.  
Indeed, our investigation of corporate governance and foreign holdings is unique because 
we combine data on a large number of firms that have wide variation in both firm- and country-
level governance parameters with a comprehensive dataset on foreign holdings of these firms.  
Prior empirical work on this topic has been hampered by data limitations because comprehensive 
data on governance and outside holdings are hard to obtain at the firm level.  In addition, our 
paper  illustrates  that  it  is  important  to  consider  both  firm  and  country  factors  in  explaining 
whether and why foreign investors shy away from poorly governed firms. 
 
                                                       
6 For additional evidence on firm-level and external corporate governance see surveys by Claessens and Fan (2002) 
and Denis and McConnell (2003).  
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3. Sample Selection and Variable Construction 
3.1 A Firm-Level Measure of the Foreign Holdings 
We design our tests to investigate foreign holdings through the eyes of U.S. investors.  In 
particular,  we  use  a  mandatory  and  confidential  survey  conducted  by  the  U.S.  Treasury 
Department and the Federal Reserve Board
7 of the holdings of all U.S. investors as of December 
1997 to obtain our foreign investment proxy: the percentage of a firm’s free float that is held by 
U.S. investors.  A more ideal dataset would be a matrix of the security-level investment from 
each country into the firms of all other countries, but such a matrix does not exist because so few 
countries collect security-level cross-border holdings data.  The limitation of including only U.S. 
investors’ holdings should not be particularly troubling since these investors collectively hold 
47% of the world’s international equity positions.
8  While the typical U.S. investor who ventures 
abroad is an institution, our data include foreign equity holdings by all types of U.S. investors 
and in all types of foreign equities; specifically, they are not limited to institutional holdings of 
U.S-traded securities, as are the data contained in SEC 13-f filings.   
It is important to note that, unlike many papers in this literature, we scale U.S. holdings 
by float (the percentage of shares not held by 5 percent or greater blockholders).  Scaling by 
market capitalization – the usual technique – could mechanically produce a negative relation 
between governance and foreign holdings, given that our governance measures are derived from 
insider holdings.  Poorly governed firms would have fewer shares available to outside investors 
and would naturally have less outside investment.  Scaling by float is more conservative and 
avoids potentially hardwiring the results. 
                                                       
7 For a primer on the surveys, see Griever, Lee, and Warnock (2001).  Publicly available country-level data—formed 
by  aggregating  the  confidential  security-level  data  used  here—have  been  analyzed  in  Ahearne,  Griever,  and 
Warnock (2004) and DPSW.  The security-level data have been studied by Ammer, Holland, Smith, and Warnock 
(2004) and, using a more limited sample, Edison and Warnock (2004). 
8 Of the $2.6 trillion in international equity positions reported to the IMF-led 1997 Coordinated Portfolio Investment 
Survey, U.S. investors held $1.2 trillion.  
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3.2 Firm-level Corporate Governance 
Our main hypothesis is that information problems are likely to play a major role, if in fact 
foreign investors avoid poorly governed firms.  Specifically, we maintain that foreign investors 
are at an informational disadvantage relative to local investors and that information asymmetries 
are particularly pronounced when it comes to evaluating firms’ governance structures.  In many 
countries  around  the  world,  financing  arrangements  and  corporate  governance  are  based  on 
relatively opaque relationships, rather than arm’s length dealings.  Ownership structures are quite 
concentrated and families control many businesses.  Understanding the relationships that govern 
firms and the motives of families and large owners requires an intricate social and institutional 
knowledge,  which  many  foreigners  lack  or  find  costly  to  obtain.    Put  differently,  poorly 
governed  firms are particularly taxing to foreign investors in terms of  their information and 
monitoring costs. 
To examine whether U.S. investment is related to firm-level corporate governance, we 
obtain ownership and control structure data for Western European firms from Faccio and Lang 
(2002); for emerging market firms from Lins (2003); and for Japan from Claessens, Djankov, 
and Lang (2000).  Ownership and control data for Japanese and emerging market firms are from 
the  1995/1996  period  and  those  from  Western  Europe  range  from  1996  to  1999,  with  the 
majority of sample observations occurring in 1996.
9 We confine our analysis to non-financial 
firms  to  maintain  consistency  across  the  three  ownership  and  control  structure  datasets.  
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), and Lins (2003) report ownership 
                                                       
9 The Treasury/Federal Reserve data on U.S. holdings is compiled for year-end 1997 and 1994.  Because our 
ownership data are predominantly from 1996, we use the 1997 data in our tests to obtain the best contemporaneous 
match.  For robustness, we re-estimate our models using the more distant-in-time 1994 U.S. holdings data and find 
that our results are qualitatively similar.  
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and control statistics for various types of blockholders.  For instance, all three studies report the 
percentage of total ultimate control rights held by Family/Management, Government, Widely-
Held Corporations, Widely-Held Financials, and Miscellaneous (which includes ownership by 
Trusts, Cooperatives, Foundations, Employees, etc.). 
In constructing our firm-level governance proxies, we focus on managerial and family 
control rights because it is the management group (and their families) that actually makes the 
operational and financial decisions of a firm and it is these decisions that potentially expropriate 
outside  investors.    We  seek  to  construct  measures  that  indicate  that  a  family  or  a  firm’s 
management is effectively in full control of the firm because, all else equal, insiders’ ability to 
expropriate  minority  shareholders  will  be  highest  when  their  control  of  a  firm  cannot  be 
challenged by other blockholders or groups of shareholders (e.g., institutional investors). 
As effective managerial control depends on the control rights held by management as 
well  as  the  control  rights  held  by  outside  blockholders,  we  use  both  nominal  and  relative 
measures of effective managerial control in our analysis.  The nominal one is the percentage of 
control rights held by the management group and its family, with the idea that higher levels of 
managerial control correspond to more effective control of a firm. The relative measures capture 
the idea that high percentage levels of control are not always necessary to establish effective 
managerial  control  and  to  prevent  interference  by  other  blockholders.    Our  three  relative 
measures  of  effective  managerial  control  are  indicator  variables  set  equal  to  one  when 
Family/Management control rights exceed: 1) the median level of Family/Management control 
rights of all sample firms in the country; 2) the median level of Family/Management control 
rights  of  all  sample  firms  in  the  country  as  well  as  the  control  rights  held  by  any  other  
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blockholder in the firm; or 3) 50% of the total outstanding shares of a firm.  Of these relative 
measures, the 50% control threshold is the strongest measure of effective managerial control.   
In our models, we also analyze the importance of non-management blockholdings by 
using the percentage of control rights and an indicator variable for non-management control 
above 50%.  These tests can be viewed as a robustness check that assures us that we do not 
simply pick up the effect of concentrated holdings, and that it is, in fact, managerial and family 
control that drives our findings. 
We note that, in many cases, our firm-level governance proxies also capture a separation 
of managerial control and cash flow rights.  To the extent that effective managerial control can 
be established at some level below 100% cash flow rights ownership, control and cash flow 
rights will be inherently separated.  Generally, managerial control of 51% of a firm’s shares will 
confer unequivocal control rights.  Given the lack of active corporate control markets in most 
sample countries as well as laws in some countries that grant special privileges to large but not 
necessarily  majority  blockholders  (e.g.,  Germany),  effective  managerial  control  can  often  be 
obtained with substantially less than 51% control, driving a further wedge between control and 
cash flow rights.  But even in the 51% control case, controlling managers that divert one dollar 
from the firm for personal gain will bear at most 51 cents of the cost, giving rise to various 
managerial agency problems [e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)].  In this sense, our proxies not 
only  capture  the  ability  but  also  the  incentives  of  controlling  insiders to  expropriate  outside 
shareholders and to consume private control benefits.
10  
To explicitly compute the wedge between control and cash flow rights, we would need to 
observe the ultimate cash flow ownership stakes held by the management group and its family 
                                                       
10 While we do not have data to separate the effect of managerial cash flow rights from control rights in our full 
sample, the analysis in Faccio and Lang (2002) and Lins (2003) suggests that, for our sample, ultimate managerial 
control rights often exceed cash flow rights because of pyramid ownership structures and superior voting shares.  
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for all of our firms.  Unfortunately, the cash flow ownership data presented in Faccio and Lang 
(2002), Lins (2003), and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) are categorized using different 
algorithms, which makes it difficult to construct a consistent measure across datasets.  Faccio 
and Lang and Claessens et al. report the separation of ownership and control for the largest 
blockholder of their sample firms (which may not be the Family/Management group), while Lins 
reports this measure for all holdings of the Family/Management group (which may not be the 
largest  blockholder).    Given  these  difficulties,  we  focus  on  the  control  rights  held  by  the 
management group and its family since this measure can be consistently identified for all sample 
countries.  However, relative to the wedge that is implicit in the construction of our control 
proxies, any further separation of control from cash flow rights via pyramids and superior voting 
shares may be a second order effect.
11 
 
3.3 Country-level Corporate Governance and Information Parameters 
Our hypothesis focuses not only on expected governance problems at the firm level, but 
also  on  country-level  differences  in  governance  and  information  flow.    We  expect  that 
information  problems  faced  by  foreign  investors  are  more  prevalent  in  countries  with  weak 
disclosure and securities regulation as well as weak governance rules.  The idea is that disclosure 
rules level the playing field among investors and make it easier to obtain information to evaluate 
firms’ governance structures.  Strict and well-enforced governance rules make knowledge about 
private control benefits and expropriation less important. 
In  our  analysis,  we  employ  several  of  the  variables  that  are  frequently  used  in  the 
international literature on stock market development and corporate governance.  First, we use the 
                                                       
11  Consistent with this conjecture, we find (in untabulated tests) that the ratio of control to cash flow rights for the 
largest blockholder from Faccio and Lang (Western Europe) and Claessens et al. (East Asia) is insignificant when 
we include it in our models in addition to our managerial and family control proxies.  
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Disclosure Requirement values reported in Table 2 of LLS (2004).  We differentiate between 
low and high disclosure countries based on whether a country is below or above our sample 
median score of 0.75 on the Disclosure Requirement measure.  We expect that foreign investors 
will have less of an information disadvantage in high disclosure countries.  Second, we follow 
Hail  and  Leuz  (2004)  and  combine  the  LLS  (2004)  Table  2  measures  of  Disclosure 
Requirements,  Liability  Standards,  and  Public  Enforcement  into  a  measure  called  Securities 
Regulation.  This measure is a comprehensive indicator of disclosure rules and their associated 
enforcement, both of which should serve to reduce the private benefits of control and thus reduce 
the importance of information regarding these benefits.  We expect that foreign investors will 
suffer less from information problems when Securities Regulation is relatively high.  Our high 
Securities Regulation subsample consists of countries that score above our sample median score 
of 0.58.  Third, as an institutional summary measure and a proxy for shareholder protection, we 
classify non-English legal origin countries as low protection because La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (hereafter LLSV) (1997, 1998) suggest that countries with a traditional 
English legal origin tend to provide stronger investor protections.  Fourth, we use the index for 
Antidirector Rights in LLSV (1998) and classify countries with Antidirector Rights below 4 as 
low protection countries and those with scores equal to or above 4 as high protection countries.   
Finally,  because  many  emerging  market  liberalization  studies  make  the  point  that 
attracting foreign capital is particularly important (as these countries often have relatively weak 
institutions), we segment countries based on whether they are classified as having emerging 
markets by The Economist magazine as of December, 1997.  This classification primarily takes 
into account a country’s GDP-per-capita, but also considers the strength of various institutions 
within the country.  
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3.4 Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
We combine the firm-level control structure data presented in Faccio and Lang (2002), 
Lins (2003), and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), resulting in 6974 firms.  We exclude 976 
financial firms. We obtain financial variable data (used in regressions) and float data from the 
Worldscope database for the year-end closest to December 31, 1997 as our U.S. holdings data 
are from that point in time and it closely corresponds to the date of our ownership and control 
data; these data are not available for 1587 firms.
12  Our final sample consists of 4411 firms. 
Table  1  provides  summary  statistics  for  our  sample  based  on  a  firm’s  country  of 
domicile.  Our sample, which includes firms from 29 countries, is concentrated in Europe (2469 
firms) and Asia (979 Japanese firms and another 800 from Emerging Asia), with relatively few 
(61) Latin American firms.  
The second column of Table 1 present mean levels of U.S. investment as a percent of 
float.  In our sample, U.S. investors hold on average 6.4% of the available float.  U.S. ownership 
is highest in Latin America, particularly Argentina,
13 and lowest in Asia.  The third column of 
Table 1 shows that our firms are quite large overall, with mean assets of 1.75 billion U.S. dollars.   
Columns 4 through 7 detail blockholder statistics for our sample. For the median firm, 
Family/Management group control is 13%, with wide variation across countries.  The median of 
the control rights held by blockholders other than the Family/Management group is 5%, with a 
similarly  wide  variation  in  this  parameter  across  countries.    The  table  shows  that  the 
Family/Management  group  is  by  far  the  dominant  type  of  controlling  blockholder. 
                                                       
12  When calculating a firm’s float, we adjust Worldscope data in two ways.  First, we correct the closely-held 
variable by subtracting the amount that Worldscope erroneously attributes to depository banks.  Second, so that float 
is measured at the same time as U.S. holdings, we utilize price data from Datastream to convert Worldscope' s fiscal 
year-end data to calendar year-end.  See AHSW for details. 
13  Argentina’s median holdings are high because most of its firms in our sample are cross-listed.  Removing all 
cross-listed firms would change summary statistics but would not alter our main results.  
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Family/Management group control rights exceed those of any other blockholder for 53% of the 
sample
14 and exceed 50% of total control rights in 22% of sample firms. 
 
4. Empirical Tests and Results 
4.1 Construction of the Empirical Model 
Firms with substantial insider holdings will almost surely have narrower total shareholder 
bases, as fewer shares are available to outside investors.  We are interested in assessing whether 
there is an additional effect of corporate governance on the shareholder base above and beyond 
this supply effect.  To control for this effect, we exclude shares tied up by insiders and other 
large blockholders and define our proxy for foreign investment as the proportion of firm i’s float 






i    º              (1) 
 
  While it is crucial to account for a firm’s float in our tests, scaling by float mechanically 
biases our results against finding a significant negative relation between Family/Management 
control and U.S. investment.
15  This bias occurs because an increase in Family/Management 
control reduces the available float.  If U.S. investment does not change, U.S. investment as a 
percentage of float nonetheless increases.  Thus, to the extent we find that Family/Management 
control  is  negatively  related  to  U.S.  ownership  as  a  share  of  float,  the  inference  that  poor 
                                                       
14 For 127 firms, we are unable to unambiguously identify the largest blockholder, so these firms are dropped from 
tests using this indicator variable. 
15 We also note that in general not all of a firm’s float is held by foreigners.  Estimates based on data contained in 
Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004), DPSW (2004), and the International Monetary Fund 1997 Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey suggest that about 30% of the world float is held by foreigners.  Thus, our tests are 
unlikely to merely reflect shifts from one group of foreign investors to another.  
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expected governance negatively impacts the foreign investor base – above and beyond the direct 
effect through limiting the float – will be particularly robust.  Conversely, any positive effect 
between U.S. investment and our blockholder control variables has to be interpreted cautiously.  
We  illustrate  this  effect  by  also  providing  results  scaling  U.S.  holdings  by  a  firm’s  market 
capitalization and controlling for free float on the right-hand side. 
In our analysis, the primary variables of interest are the control structure variables that 
proxy for expected firm-level corporate governance.  Before directly assessing these variables, it 
is important to control for a firm’s size, leverage, growth prospects, and international presence, 
because prior studies show that these factors are related to portfolio investment levels.  Kang and 
Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) document that foreign investors in Japan and 
Sweden avoid small, highly levered stocks that do not have an international presence, possibly 
because information about them is less readily available.  Consistent with this interpretation, 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that the local bias is greater for such firms.  Foreign investors 
in Japanese and Swedish equities also show a preference for growth stocks.  
We control for Size, calculated as the log of total assets converted to thousands of U.S. 
dollars, and for Leverage using the ratio of total debt to total assets. Firms with higher leverage 
are more financially vulnerable and, thus, might attract less outside investment.  This variable is 
also  important  as  a  governance  control  because  Harvey,  Lins,  and  Roper  (2004)  find  that 
leverage can mitigate the value loss associated with firm-level agency problems. We include a 
cross-listing dummy variable, XLIST, that takes the value of one if the firm is listed on a U.S. 
exchange as a proxy for both an international presence and a lessening of direct and indirect  
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barriers to international investment.
16  For similar reasons, we also control for a firm’s inclusion 
in the MSCI World Index. 
We include two proxies for growth in our models. Book-to-market, calculated as the book 
value per share over the year-end market price, is included because a preference for growth 
stocks can be reflected in a tendency to hold low book-to-market value stocks. Dividend Yield, 
calculated as dividends per share over the year-end market price, could be related to growth if 
firms with better growth prospects pay lower dividends as they plow revenues back into the firm.  
If U.S. investors prefer growth stocks and these two measures capture growth opportunities, we 
would expect to see a negative relation between each measure and U.S. holdings.  However, low 
dividend  payments  by  non-U.S.  firms  could  also  represent  expected  firm-level  governance 
problems (LLSV (2000) and Kalcheva and Lins (2005)) in which case dividend yields could be 
positively  related  to  U.S.  holdings  if  U.S.  investors  seek  to  avoid  firms  with  poor  expected 
governance.  Because investors often favor certain industries, we include industry-fixed effects 
(based on the groupings in Campbell (1996)).  We include country-fixed effects in our models 
because singular country-level variables for disclosure, legal origin, etc., are unlikely to capture 
all relevant institutional differences across countries (e.g., both Hong Kong and the U.K. have 
English legal origin, yet their ownership structures could not be more different). 
Although more than 75% of the  firms in our sample are held by  at least some U.S. 
investors, the non-trivial number of firms with zero U.S. holdings prompts us to utilize a Tobit 
regression model.  Specifically, we estimate Tobit regression models of the following form: 
 
                                                       
16 A firm’s foreign sales, another measure of international presence, has poor coverage in Worldscope, so we follow 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) and utilize a cross-listing variable.  As we note earlier, cross listing can also proxy 
for improved governance and information flow.  
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Controls Industry  ￿   Controls Country  ￿  
  Yield   Dividend ￿ + Market   Book to ￿   + Leverage ￿ Size   Firm ￿ +
MSCI ￿ + XLIST ￿     Control Family    and   Managerial ￿ + ￿ = investment   U.S.
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7 6 5 4




  (2) 
where  U.S.  investment  is  U.S.  holdings  as  a  percentage  of  available  float  and  the 
Managerial  and  Family  Control  variables  are  the  percentage  of  Family/Management  control 
rights; an indicator variable set equal to one if the Family/Management group’s control rights are 
greater than the median value of the control rights held by the Family/Management group for all 
firms in its country; an indicator variable set equal to one if the Family/Management group’s 
control rights are greater than the median country value and the Family/Management group is the 
largest  blockholder  of  control  rights;  and  an  indicator  variable  set  equal  to  one  if 
Family/Management  has  majority  (i.e.,  >50%)  control  rights,  respectively.    For  comparison 
purposes,  we  also  use  the  percentage  of  control  rights  held  by  Other  (i.e.,  non-
Family/Management) blockholders or an indicator that Other blockholder control rights exceed 
50%. 
 
4.2 Firm-level Corporate Governance Results 
The  important  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  further  advance  our  understanding  of 
corporate  governance  and  foreign  investment  by  conducting  tests  that  discriminate  within 
country based on firm-level governance parameters, and that do so for a wide range of countries.   
Table 2 reports the coefficients of Tobit models estimated on our full sample of 4411 
firms from 29 countries.    Model 1 of Table 2 tests our nominal measure of effective managerial 
control.  The model shows that after controlling for other factors, an increase in the control rights 
held by the Family/Management group corresponds to a decrease in U.S. investment.  The 25
th 
percentile for Family/Management control is zero and the 75
th percentile is 44%.  The coefficient  
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of  –0.018  (significant  at  the  5%  level)  indicates  that,  all  else  equal,  a  firm  in  which 
Family/Management  control  changes  from  the  25
th  to  the  75
th  percentile  would  have  U.S. 
investment (as a share of market capitalization) that is 0.8 percentage points lower.   
In  Models  2  through  4  we  use  progressively  more  stringent  relative  measures  of 
Family/Management  control.  Results  for  the  second  and  third  models  show  insignificant 
coefficients on a dummy variable for above-median Family/Management control and a dummy 
variable  for  the  combination  of  above-median  Family/Management  control  and  the 
Family/Management group being the largest blockholder.  Only the strongest relative measure of 
control – a dummy  for  Family/Management  control above 50% – is significantly negatively 
related to U.S. investment.  Model 4 shows that majority Family/Management control rights are 
associated with a -0.83 percentage point reduction in U.S. investment (significant at the 10% 
level).  The fifth and sixth models show that the control held by all blockholder types other than 
the  Family/Management  group  is  not  significantly  related  to  U.S.  investment.    This  lack  of 
significance is comforting in the sense that it highlights that our results are driven by ownership 
structures  that  are  more  likely  to  give  rise  to  governance  concerns,  rather  than  ownership 
concentration per se.  The latter category includes a wide range of blockholders and there is less 
of a reason to expect that these outside blockholders have the ability to consume significant 
private benefits of control or to distort information flows.  
We also note that control variables included in the models show signs consistent with 
expectations.  U.S. investment is higher in firms that are cross-listed on a U.S. exchange or are in 
the MSCI World  Index, and are larger.   U.S. investment is lower in firms that have higher 
leverage and higher book to market ratios.  The coefficient on dividend yield is generally not 
significantly different from zero.  
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Taken  together,  the  significant  results  in  Table  2  for  our  two  strongest  measures  of 
Family/Management control provide moderate, but not overwhelming, support for the hypothesis 
that the presence of potentially high private benefits of control at the firm level dissuades equity 
investment by foreign investors. 
 
4.3 Firm-level Results Segmented by Country-level Parameters 
We mention at the outset of this paper that increased access to foreign capital is thought 
to be particularly important for firms from emerging markets.  As such, we next test whether 
poor firm level governance is significantly related to foreign investment in the subset of our 
sample countries that constitute emerging markets.  Table 3 reports the results of these model 
estimations  for  the  1017  emerging  market  firms  from  our  sample.    We  find  in  Models  (1) 
through  (4)  that  firm-level  proxies  for  governance  problems  and  expropriation  are  not 
significantly related to U.S. holdings in emerging markets (and Models (5) and (6) show that 
non-inside  blockholdings  remain  unrelated  as  well).    While  the  Family/Management  control 
results  seems  to  go  against  prevailing  intuition,  the  classification  of  countries  as  “emerging 
markets” based primarily on per-capita GDP does not account for the substantial variation in 
countries’ institutional structures as they relate to disclosure, shareholder protection, and legal 
enforcement. 
Empirical  evidence  across  a  range  of  emerging  markets  shows  that  insiders’  private 
control benefits are particularly high when countries’ shareholder protections are the weakest 
[Lins (2003) and Klapper and Love (2004)].  Variation in private control benefits is found across 
developed countries as well, and it is again the institutions that matter [Nenova (2003), Doidge 
(2004), and Dyck and Zingales (2004)].  In a similar vein, Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004) show  
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that the combination of firm- and country-level governance problems has particularly negative 
implications  for  a  firm’s  analyst  following  and  information  environment.    Our  information 
argument suggests that information problems for foreign investors are particularly pronounced 
when  both  firm-level  governance  and  country-level  institutions  are  weak  –  thus,  a  more 
fundamental  test  of  our  hypotheses  will  take  account  of  particular  country-level  parameters 
related to information flow and governance.  It follows that foreign investors are likely to invest 
less in countries where information flow and governance is poor.  But, given that investors want 
to invest in a certain country for portfolio diversification reasons, they are likely to pick those 
stocks for which information asymmetry problems should be the smallest.   
To capture this interplay between firm- and country-level governance and information 
flow effects, beginning with Table 4 we re-estimate our previous regressions, partitioning the 
sample  based  on  our  country-level  governance  and  information  flow  proxies:  Disclosure 
Requirements, Securities Regulation, Legal Origin, and Antidirector Rights.  Our previous full 
sample tests and emerging markets subsample tests did not explicitly segment countries on the 
basis of these underlying institutional factors.  Meaningful cross-sectional variation in the effect 
of the control structure variables also alleviates potential concerns that our previous findings are 
driven by correlated omitted variables. 
Table 4 presents the association between our firm-level  governance proxies and U.S. 
investment based on Disclosure Requirements.  Panel A reports results for our low Disclosure 
Requirements subsample comprised of countries whose score is below our sample median score 
of 0.75.  Model 1, which tests our nominal measure of effective managerial control, again shows 
that an increase in the control rights held by the Family/Management group corresponds to a 
decrease in U.S. investment, but the negative coefficient is much larger and more significant than  
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it was in the all-country model estimated in Table 2.  The 25
th percentile for Family/Management 
control in this subsample is zero and the 75
th percentile is 49%.   The  coefficient of –0.041 
indicates  that,  all  else  equal,  a  firm  in  a  low  shareholder  rights  country  for  which 
Family/Management  control  changes  from  the  25
th  to  the  75
th  percentile  would  have  U.S. 
investment (as a share of float) that is 2 percentage points lower, an economically significant 
amount given that average U.S. investment is 6.4%.   
Results  for  the  second,  third,  and  fourth  models  –  which  use  relative  measures  of 
Family/Management control – are similarly strong in magnitude and significance.  For example, 
Model  4  shows  that  majority  Family/Management  control  rights  are  associated  with  a  2.3 
percentage point reduction in U.S. investment.  As before, the fifth and sixth models show that 
the  control  held  by  all  blockholder  types  other  than  the  Family/Management  group  is  not 
significantly  related  to  U.S.  investment.    Overall,  the  low  disclosure  subsample  results  are 
consistent with the argument that foreign outside investors adjust their quantity of investment 
significantly when information asymmetries are likely to most pronounced.   
Panel B reports results for the high Disclosure Requirements subsample.  We observe that 
none of the blockholder coefficients are negative and significant.  We also report in the bottom 
row of Panel B the comparison between between the blockholder coefficients in the low and high 
protection  subsamples.    We  find  that  all  four  of  the  managerial  control  coefficients  are 
significantly more negative in the low protection subsample (p-values <= 0.01).
17  These results 
confirm that the country-level disclosure environment has an important impact on how foreign 
investors perceive firm-level governance problems. 
                                                       
17 The significance level is based on (untabulated) combined regressions in which all variables are interacted with an 
indicator variable set equal to one when a country belongs to the low protection subsample.  
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In Tables 5 through 7, we split the sample based on three proxies for a country’s overall 
level of investor protection.  Higher protection reduces the private benefits of control and thus 
reduces the importance of information regarding these benefits.  We expect that even if firms 
themselves have governance structures indicating potentially large private benefits of control, 
foreign  investors  will  suffer  less  from  information  problems  when  investor  protection  is 
relatively high, and will therefore invest in greater quantities in these firms. On the flip side, we 
expect  less  foreign  investment  in  firms  likely  to  have  high  private  benefits  of  control  when 
external investor protection is relatively weak.  
Table 5 features our Securities Regulation measure of shareholder protection.  Panel A 
shows  that  the  coefficients  on  our  one  nominal  and  three  relative  measures  of 
Family/Management control are always negative and highly significant in the low protection 
subsample.  The coefficients are similar in economic significance to those found in the low 
disclosure  subsample  reported  in  Table  4.    The  coefficients  on  other  blockholdings  are 
insignificant.   In Panel B, which reports results for the high Securities Regulation subsample, we 
observe that none of the blockholder coefficients are negative and significant.  In fact, several 
coefficients  are  significantly  positive,  but  as  our  float-normalized  dependent  variable 
mechanically  induces  a  positive  bias,  it  is  not  appropriate  to  read  much  into  this  finding.
18  
Again, we find that the difference in the four effective managerial control coefficients between 
the low and high protection subsamples is always highly significant.  
In Table 6, we split the sample based on non-English and English legal origin.  As before, 
Panel A shows that the coefficients on all Family/Management control measures  are  always 
                                                       
18 Consistent with this claim, we show in subsequent robustness tests (Section 4.5) that scaling U.S. investment by 
total equity market capitalization, instead of float, results in insignificant coefficients for all ownership structure 
variables in countries with strong governance or securities regulation, but the coefficients on Family/Management 
control remain significantly negative in countries with weak institutions.  
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negative and highly significant in the non-English subsample and that the coefficients on other 
blockholdings are insignificant.  Also, we find that the difference in the four effective managerial 
control  coefficients  between  the  non-Engish  and  English  legal  origin  subsamples  is  always 
highly significant.  In Table 7, we split the sample based on a country’s Antidirector Rights and 
find that the coefficients on the effective managerial control measures are all negative and highly 
significant  in  the  low  shareholder  protection  subsample  (Panel  A),  insignificant  in  the  high 
protection  subsample  (Panel  B),  and  the  coefficient  differences  between  the  subsamples  are 
highly significant. 
 
4.4 Earnings Management and Foreign Investment 
In  this  section,  we  attempt  to  shed  some  light  on  the  mechanism  by  which  poor 
governance manifests itself in lower holdings by U.S. investors.  Towards this end, we analyze 
whether higher levels of earnings management are associated with lower levels of U.S. holdings.  
The basic idea is that earnings management is an indicator of opaque financial statements and 
poor information flows, created by poor corporate governance.  Supporting this notion, Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) and Ha, Hu, Hwang, and Wu (2004) show that poor country-level 
and firm-level governance is associated with higher levels of earnings management.  Thus, if 
information  problems  are  at  the  core  of  the  holdings  effect,  we  expect  to  find  a  negative 
association between earnings management and foreign holdings.
19 
To obtain firm-level proxies, we compute the earnings management variables from the 
time series of firms’ earnings, accruals and cash flows from 1992 to 1997 and require that each 
                                                       
19 In a similar vein, Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005) show that investment in emerging market firms is 
positively  associated  with  an  aggregate  accounting  transparency  measure.    Across  emerging  and  developed 
economies, Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller (2004) show that U.S. investment is positively related to a firm’s U.S. 
GAAP conformity.    
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firm has at least three years of relevant data.  Cash flow from operations is calculated using the 
balance-sheet approach because U.S. style cash flow statements are generally not available for 
our sample companies.
20  If a firm does not report information on cash or short-term debt, then 
the changes in both variables are assumed to be zero.  We scale earnings, accruals, and operating 
cash flows by lagged total assets prior to further computations to ensure comparability across 
firms and truncate extreme observations at the top and bottom percentile. 
We consider two proxies.  First, based on Haw, Hu, Hwang, and Wu (2004) and Wysocki 
(2004), we compute the time-series median magnitude of accruals relative to the cash flow from 
operations.  Second, following Leuz et al. (2003), we compute three different proxies capturing a 
wide  range  of  earnings  management  activities:  i.e.,  the  magnitude  of  total  accruals,  the 
smoothness of earnings relative to cash flows, and the correlation of accounting accruals and 
operating cash flows.
21  Specifically, the first variable is the time-series median of the absolute 
value of accruals scaled by the contemporaneous operating cash flow.  The second variable is 
computed as the time-series standard deviation of operating income over the time-series standard 
deviation of operating cash flows.  The third variable is the time-series correlation of changes in 
the accruals and operating cash flows.  The scores are averaged for each firm and are ranked 
such that higher values indicate more earnings management. 
We recognize that these proxies are not perfect and indicate earnings management only in 
a relative sense.  But in their defense, the more extreme the realizations of the measures become, 
the less likely it is that they reflect informative earnings, especially when considering that we 
compute them as medians of a large set of firms over several years.  Moreover, the proxies are 
                                                       
20  Following Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), we compute the accrual component of earnings as (￿ total 
current assets – ￿ cash) – (￿ total current liabilities – ￿ short-term debt) – depreciation expense, where ￿ denotes the 
change over the last fiscal year. 
21  We do not compute a proxy for loss aversion as in Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) because it cannot be 
reasonably computed at the firm level.  
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constructed  relative  to  outcomes  of  firms’  economic  processes,  such  as  the  magnitude  or 
smoothness of the operating cash flows, which makes it more likely that they capture firms’ 
reporting choices to make earnings more or less informative.  Finally, several recent studies 
suggest that these proxies yield country rankings that are consistent with widespread perceptions 
of earnings informativeness, and that the proxies behave in a plausible fashion around events 
such as U.S. cross listings (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003; Wysocki, 2004). 
Table  8  reports  results  from  Tobit  regressions  replacing  the  firm-level  governance 
proxies with the two earnings management proxies.  For the sake of brevity, we report only the 
findings splitting the sample by the level of securities regulation.  The results are very similar 
using the other split variables (i.e., shareholder protection, disclosure requirements, and English 
legal origin) and are also present in the full sample of countries, albeit at a slightly weaker level 
(consistent with the results for the governance variables).  Table 8 shows that both earnings 
management  proxies  are  significantly  and  negatively  associated  with  foreign  holdings  in  the 
countries where securities regulation is weak.  In contrast, the coefficients are insignificant in 
countries with strong securities regulation.  As before, the combination of weak country-level 
institutions and poor firm-level governance is important for the holdings effect. 
These findings suggest that U.S. investors hold fewer shares in firms with higher levels of 
earnings management, consistent with the hypothesis that information flows play an important 
role for foreigners’ investment decisions.  While these tests more directly focus on information 
flows than our tests using the governance proxies, it should be kept in mind that the quality of 
the information flows is in part driven by country-level institutions and firm-level governance.  
For this reason, we prefer to use the governance variables for our main analyses, which can be 
viewed as estimating a reduced form.  The analyses in this section are primarily meant to shed  
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additional light on the mechanism by which poor governance manifests itself in fewer holdings 
by foreign investors. 
 
4.5 Robustness Checks 
In this section, we discuss several tests of robustness of our main firm-level governance 
regressions, which are not tabulated for sake of brevity.  For instance, there is a clustering of 
observations in Japan and the U.K., creating the possibility that the results are dominated by one 
or two countries.  For Japan, Lins and Servaes (1999) find that strong keiretsu membership is an 
indicator of governance problems, whereas ownership structure is not.  Claessens, Djankov, Fan, 
and Lang (2002) exclude Japan from their analysis of ownership structure in East Asia because 
the keiretsu system influences governance in ways that cannot be captured by ownership data.  
The country dummies included in our analysis control for unique country parameters, but as a 
robustness check we re-estimate our firm-level regressions without Japan, the U.K., or both.  In 
our study, removing Japan from the sample has virtually no effect on our main results.  If we 
remove the U.K., our main results continue to hold – foreigners invest less in poorly governed 
firms that are in poor governance environments – but due to some wide confidence intervals in 
the strong-institution subsample regressions, differences in the coefficients between the strong- 
and weak-institution subsamples are in a few cases only marginally significant. 
While we closely follow the literature on the determinants of foreign portfolio holdings 
when setting up our tests, it is possible that we have not modeled all of the variables that could 
affect foreign holdings.  In particular, one might be concerned about the effects of liquidity and 
return momentum on the holdings of U.S. investors.  Our tests include a firm’s equity market 
capitalization and its book-to-market ratio which likely capture aspects of liquidity and return  
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momentum, respectively.  But it is possible to construct some more direct measures for liquidity 
and momentum.  As a robustness check, we re-estimate our models with the inclusion of these 
variables.  Specifically, we follow Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) and Lesmond (2005) 
and proxy for liquidity with the percentage of trading days in the 1997 calendar year in which the 
stock had zero return for the day.  We compute this measure only for firms with price data 
reported for at least 100 trading days in 1997.  We compute a momentum variable defined as the 
12 month buy-and-hold stock return over the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997, 
winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percent levels.  
In Panel A of Table 9, we report the main results of the re-estimation of our base case 
models with the inclusion of liquidity and momentum variables.  For the sake of brevity, we 
report  only  the  coefficients  on  our  two  strongest  measures  of  effective  managerial  control 
(managerial  and  family  control  rights  percentage  and  an  indicator  variable  corresponding  to 
majority  managerial  and  family  control  rights)  and  do  so  for  only  two  of  our  country-level 
sample splits (Disclosure Requirements and Security Regulation).  Despite a slightly smaller 
sample size, Panel A shows that the inclusion of liquidity and momentum control variable does 
not change our inferences.  U.S. holdings are significantly lower when managers are likely to 
have effective control of their firms and the firms are domiciled in countries with poor disclosure 
and governance requirements.
22 
Throughout this paper we have scaled U.S. investment by float, for the reasons described 
in Section 4.1.  By making this choice, we mechanically bias against finding that any type of 
blockholding is negatively related to U.S. investment.  On the other hand, scaling by market 
capitalization – even when controlling for float on the right hand side – likely biases the results 
                                                       
22 Results for the other effective managerial control variables and other splits by institutional variables are 
qualitatively similar.  
  31 
in favor of finding that large blockholdings are related to lower foreign holdings.  To illustrate 
this issue and gauge the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate our regressions scaling U.S. 
holdings by market capitalization (and controlling for float on the right-hand side).  We do so for 
our base case models and for models which include liquidity and momentum control variables.  
For brevity, we again report only a partial set of coefficients.   
Panel B of Table 9 shows that our results hold and even strengthen when we scale U.S. 
holdings by equity market capitalization and control for float on the right hand side.  We find 
that the coefficients and t-statistics on our Family/Management control variables increase sharply 
in our low disclosure/protection subsamples relative to the float-normalized measure used thus 
far in the paper.  While not tabulated, this outcome is true for the other managerial control 
variables  and  institutional  country-level  sample  splits  as  well.    Further,  when  scaling  U.S. 
investment by market capitalization, we find that Other Blockholder control is never significant 
in any of the high or low subsample splits or overall and that Family/Management control is 
never  positively  related  to  U.S.  holdings  in  high  disclosure/protection  subsamples.    These 
findings show that scaling U.S. investment by float does not unduly affect our results and, if 
anything,  biases  against  our  hypothesis.    Furthermore,  the  different  results  for 
Family/Management control and Other Blockholders illustrate that our findings are not simply a 
manifestation of ownership concentration. 
Finally, Ammer, Holland, Smith and Warnock (2004) find that whether a foreign firm is 
cross-listed on a U.S. exchange is the single most important determinant of U.S. investment.
23  
As such, we control for a U.S. listing in all models.  However, as noted by Lang, Raedy, and 
Yetman (2003), cross listing is a firm choice that necessitates many substantive changes (which 
                                                       
23  Indeed,  an  effort  to  enhance  the  shareholder  base  is  often  cited  as  an  explanation  for  why  non-U.S.  firms 
undertake costly information-providing efforts such as listing on U.S. stock exchanges [Reese and Weisbach (2002) 
and Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2005)].    
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often  greatly  improve  information  flow),  suggesting  that  cross-listed  firms  may  not  be 
representative of a country’s total population of publicly traded firms.  To confirm that cross-
listed firms are not unduly influencing our results, we re-estimate our regressions limiting the 
samples to non-cross-listed firms.  Eliminating the 140 cross-listed firms has no effect on results 
for our full or emerging markets samples or for our sample splits by country-level institutional 
parameters.  These untabulated robustness tests confirm that, net of cross-listing effects, poor 
firm-level governance is a deterrent to foreign investment when country-level disclosure and 
shareholder protection is weak. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the relation between foreign investment and corporate governance.  
Foreign investors can play an important role in funding corporations, especially in countries in 
which domestic sources of outside finance are  limited.  However, institutional investors and 
regulators frequently claim that poor corporate governance is a substantial deterrent.  As outside 
investors who fear governance problems can protect themselves by lowering the price they are 
willing to pay for a poorly governed firm’s shares, it is not obvious that governance concerns 
will manifest themselves in fewer holdings.  On the other hand, poorly governed firms from 
countries with weak institutions are likely to be particularly taxing on foreign investors in terms 
of their information and monitoring costs, which could explain why foreigners shy away from 
these firms. 
We conduct tests on the relation between foreign investment and corporate governance 
for a sample of 4,411 firms from 29 countries.  Using U.S. holdings as a proxy for foreign 
investment, we show that foreigners invest less in firms that are poorly governed.  Specifically,  
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we  find  that  firms  with  ownership  structures  that  are  more  conducive  to  outside  investor 
expropriation attract significantly less U.S. investment.  We show that this finding is not simply a 
matter of a country’s economic development but appears to be directly related to a country’s 
legal institutions and information rules.  Our paper is the first to provide compelling evidence for 
a large sample across many countries that foreigners do indeed invest less in poorly governed 
firms.  We argue that information problems faced by foreign investors play an important role in 
this result.  Supporting this explanation, we show that foreign investment in firms that appear to 
engage in more earnings management is lower in countries with poor information frameworks 
and legal institutions. 
Our  findings  provide  a  sense  that  country-level  improvements  in  disclosure  and 
governance practices and firm-level improvements in governance or information flows are likely 
to attract more U.S. investment.  To the extent that this attracts more total investment into a 
country, it implies that the home bias may be attenuated with such governance and information 
flow improvements.  A test of changes in governance and information flows and changes in 
foreign investment choices across time may therefore be a potentially fruitful topic for future 
research.    
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Table 1  
Basic Summary Statistics by Country 
U.S. Investment, obtained from AHSW, is the percent of the firm’s float that was held by U.S. portfolio investors as of 
end-1997, where float is the percentage of shares not held by large blockholders (as given by Worldscope’s Closely Held 
variable) multiplied by the market value of equity in billions of U.S. dollars.  Size is the value of FY1997 total assets in 
millions  of  U.S.  dollars.    Ownership  data  list  the  median  value  of  total  direct  and  indirect  control  rights  held  by 
blockholder  type.    Family/Management  (Mgmt)  refers  to  total  control  rights  held  by  family  groups  and  the  top 
management  group.    Other  Blockholders  (BH)  refers  to  total  control  rights  held  by  blockholders  other  than 
Family/Management.  Ownership structure data are obtained from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang 
(2002), and Lins (2003).  N is the number of firms that have data on ownership structure, end-1997 market capitalization 
from Datastream, and basic  balance sheet  variables from Worldscope.  Numbers in parentheses indicate the smaller 
sample sizes for data on the frequency that Family/Mgmt control is greater than control by any other type of BH. 








































Argentina  6  54.0  4595  0  57  17  0 
Austria  23  12.7  1429  38  0  52  43 
Belgium  57  3.5  2275  45  0  72  42 
Brazil  16  27.0  6408  0  22  25 (8)  13 
Chile  39  11.7  1323  0  0  89 (19)  21 
Czech Republic  6  13.9  169  0  5  67 (3)  17 
Finland  60  9.9    913  23  0  58  25 
France  359  7.5  2205  51  0  83  55 
Germany  375  4.9  2383  56  0  82  60 
Hong Kong  183  11.2  1035  42  0  80 (169)  40 
Indonesia  19  10.5  217  0  7  64 (11)  32 
Ireland  38  10.6  410  0  12  29  8 
Israel  7  19.9  1647  50  0  71  57 
Italy  53  9.0  4063  45  0  72  43 
Japan  979  3.5  3012  0  10  14  0 
Korea (South)  165  4.5  1996  14  5  75 (150)  1 
Malaysia  250   4.6  586  30  16  71 (236)  18 
Norway  90   9.4  799  25  0  61  16 
Philippines  20  13.7  324  3  0  67 (9)  15 
Portugal  32  11.2  744  49  0  84 (31)  50 
Singapore  133  7.1  611  29  21  65 (126)  33 
South Africa  102  8.0  775  7  9  57 (82)  41 
Spain  63  8.4  2083  27  0  59  30 
Sweden  136  9.2  1328  22  0  59  21 
Switzerland  84  9.8  1390  50  0  73  50 
Taiwan  9  1.8  659  0  0  100 (4)  0 
Thailand  14  13.3  372  25  10  69 (13)  14 
Turkey  16  32.8  211  19  48  44  38 
UK  1077  5.7  1010  11  0  47  11 
Total  4411  6.4  1754  13  5  52 (4284)  22 
  Europe  2469  6.9  1519  22  0  62 (2464)  30 
  Latin America  61  19.8  2978  0  0  61 (33)  16 
  Emerging Asia  800  7.1  975  25  7  73 (725)  23 
  Other  1081  3.9  2800  0  10  17 (1061)  4  
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Table 2 
U.S. Investment and Blockholder Control – Full Sample of Countries 
Tobit regression estimates of U.S. Investment scaled by float on blockholder control variables of interest and firm-
level  controls.    U.S.  Investment  is  as  of  end-1997  and  is  defined  the  dollar  value  of  U.S.  investors’  portfolio 
holdings as a share of float, where float is defined as the percentage of shares not held by large blockholders (as 
given by Worldscope’s Closely Held variable) multiplied by the market value of equity in billions of U.S. dollars.  
XLIST and MSCI are indicator variables that take on the value one if the firm’s equity is listed on a U.S. exchange 
or in the MSCI World Index, respectively.  Ln(Size) is the log of total assets in millions of U.S. dollars.  Leverage is 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  Book-to-market is book equity value over market equity value.  Dividend 
yield is the preceding twelve months dividends paid over price.  Financial variables are from Worldscope and are for 
fiscal year 1997.  Indicator variables for countries and industry groups (based on the classification of Campbell, 
1996) are included but not reported. For each coefficient, the p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality with zero is 
reported in parentheses.   
  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Family/Mgmt control percentage  -0.018           
  (0.021)           
Family/Mgmt control GT med    -0.099         
    (0.784)         
Family/Mgmt GT med & largest BH      -0.286       
      (0.435)       
Family/Mgmt control GT 50%        -0.829     
        (0.082)     
Other BH control percentage          0.005   
          (0.560)   
Other BH control GT 50%             0.357 
            (0.604) 
XLIST  9.952  9.978  9.420  9.982  9.987  9.983 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MSCI Membership  3.549  3.631  3.459  3.568  3.642  3.639 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln(Size)  3.115  3.152  3.137  3.138  3.152  3.153 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.103  -0.104  -0.103  -0.103  -0.103  -0.103 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Book-to-market  -1.021  -1.019  -1.061  -1.032  -1.016  -1.017 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Dividend Yield  -0.105  -0.104  -0.092  -0.101  -0.106  -0.104 
  (0.254)  (0.261)  (0.326)  (0.272)  (0.250)  (0.256) 
             
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 N  4411  4411  4284  4411  4411  4411 
Pseudo R
2   0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  
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Table 3 
U.S. Investment and Blockholder Control – Emerging Markets 
Tobit regression estimates of U.S. Investment scaled by float on blockholder control variables of interest and firm-
level  controls  in  emerging  markets.    Emerging  markets  are  defined  based  on  classifications  in  the  Economist 
magazine in December, 1997.  U.S. Investment is as of end-1997 and is defined the dollar value of U.S. investors’ 
portfolio  holdings  as  a  share  of  float,  where  float  is  defined  as  the  percentage  of  shares  not  held  by  large 
blockholders (as given by Worldscope’s Closely Held variable) multiplied by the market value of equity in billions 
of U.S. dollars. XLIST and MSCI are indicator variables that take on the value one if the firm’s equity is listed on a 
U.S. exchange or in the MSCI World Index, respectively.  Ln(Size) is the log of total assets in millions of U.S. 
dollars.  Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  Book-to-market is book equity value over market 
equity value.  Dividend yield is the preceding twelve months dividends paid over price.  Financial variables are from 
Worldscope  and  are  for  fiscal  year  1997.   Indicator  variables  for  countries  and  industry  groups  (based  on  the 
classification of Campbell, 1996) are included but not reported. For each coefficient, the p-value of the two-tailed t-
test of equality with zero is reported in parentheses.   
  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Family/Mgmt control percentage  0.017           
  (0.917)           
Family/Mgmt control GT med    0.459         
    (0.558)         
Family/Mgmt GT med & largest BH      0.566       
      (0.496)       
Family/Mgmt control GT 50%        0.917     
        (0.343)     
Other BH control percentage          0.019   
          (0.298)   
Other BH control GT 50%             0.724 
            (0.546) 
XLIST  11.75  11.79  7.828  11.86  11.49  11.66 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MSCI Membership  8.185  8.190  8.441  8.271  8.145  8.166 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln(Size)  3.786  3.795  3.749  3.783  3.732  3.766 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.138  -0.138  -0.138  -0.138  -0.135  -0.136 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Book-to-market  -0.834  -0.834  -0.889  -0.816  -0.817  -0.829 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.017) 
Dividend Yield  0.180  0.180  0.267  0.176  0.168  0.173 
  (0.282)  (0.281)  (0.131)  (0.292)  (0.315)  (0.300) 
             
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 N  1017  1017  890  1017  1017  1017 
Pseudo R
2   0.08  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.08 
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Table 4 
U.S. Investment, Blockholder Control, and Disclosure Requirements 
Tobit  regression  estimates  of  U.S.  Investment  scaled  by  float  on  blockholder  control  variables  of  interest  and 
controls  estimated  on  subsamples  of  countries  with  low  and  high  disclosure  requirements.    “Disclosure 
Requirement” values potentially range from 0 to 1 and are obtained from Table 2 of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2004).  The “High Disclosure Requirements” subsample contains countries that score above our sample 
median of 0.75 on the Disclosure Requirement measure. U.S. Investment is as of end-1997 and is defined the dollar 
value of U.S. investors’ portfolio holdings as a share of float, where float is defined as the percentage of shares not 
held by large blockholders (as given by Worldscope’s Closely Held variable) multiplied by the market value of 
equity in billions of U.S. dollars. Other model variables are described previously in Table 2. Indicator variables for 
countries and industry groups (based on the classification of Campbell, 1996) are included but not reported. For each 
coefficient, the p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality with zero is reported in parentheses.  At the bottom of 
Panel B, we report the p-value of the difference in coefficients on the blockholder variable of interest in the low and 
high disclosure requirement subsamples. 
  
Panel A: Low Disclosure Requirements 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Family/Mgmt control percentage  -0.041           
  (0.000)           
Family/Mgmt control GT med    -1.046         
    (0.025)         
Family/Mgmt GT med & largest BH      -1.201       
      (0.013)       
Family/Mgmt control GT 50%        -2.295     
        (0.000)     
Other BH control percentage          -0.012   
          (0.355)   
Other BH control GT 50%            -0.470 
            (0.606) 
XLIST  9.948  10.094  8.952  10.031  10.095  10.104 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MSCI Membership  2.111  2.236  2.223  2.161  2.246  2.264 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln(Size)  3.134  3.187  3.179  3.169  3.263  3.254 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.132  -0.133  -0.134  -0.132  -0.134  -0.134 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Book-to-market  -0.852  -0.845  -0.668  -0.866  -0.848  -0.843 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.037)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Dividend Yield  -0.164  -0.164  -0.117  -0.157  -0.172  -0.174 
  (0.219)  (0.217)  (0.390)  (0.238)  (0.196)  (0.191) 
             
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 N  2626  2626  2569  2626  2626  2626 
Pseudo R
2   0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  
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Panel B: High Disclosure Requirements 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Family/Mgmt control percentage  0.006           
  (0.601)           
Family/Mgmt control GT med    0.814         
    (0.142)         
Family/Mgmt GT med & largest BH      0.647       
      (0.250)       
Family/Mgmt control GT 50%        0.9050     
        (0.226)     
Other BH control percentage          0.024   
          (0.094)   
Other BH control GT 50%            1.237 
            (0.238) 
XLIST  9.443  9.511  9.569  9.422  9.464  9.446 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MSCI Membership  6.169  6.162  5.892  6.252  6.095  6.094 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln(Size)  2.935  2.960  2.921  2.930  2.932  2.930 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.049  -0.050  -0.045  -0.049  -0.047  -0.047 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Book-to-market  -1.269  -1.276  -1.638  -1.247  -1.263  -1.266 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Dividend Yield  -0.105  -0.098  -0.087  -0.106  -0.047  -0.119 
  (0.420)  (0.451)  (0.511)  (0.414)  (0.007)  (0.361) 
             
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 N  1779  1779  1712  1779  1779  1779 
Pseudo R
2   0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05 
 
P-value on blockholder coefficient 
difference between subsamples 
0.002  0.008  0.010  0.001  0.331  0.224 
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Table 5 
U.S. Investment, Blockholder Control, and Securities Regulation 
Tobit regression estimates of U.S. Investment scaled by float estimated on subsamples of countries with low and high 
scores on securities regulation.  “Securities Regulation” values potentially range from 0 to 1 and are defined as in Hail and 
Leuz (2004) as the average of the Disclosure Requirements, Liability Standards, and Public Enforcement indexes, which 
are  obtained  from  Table  2  of  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and  Shleifer  (2004).    The  “High  Securities  Regulation” 
subsample contains countries that score above our sample median of 0.58 on the Securities Regulation measure. U.S. 
Investment is as of end-1997 and is defined the dollar value of U.S. investors’ portfolio holdings as a share of float, where 
float is as defined in Table 2.  Other model variables are described previously in Table 2. Indicator variables for countries 
and industry groups (based on the classification of Campbell, 1996) are included but not reported. For each coefficient, 
the p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality with zero is reported in parentheses. At the bottom of Panel B, we report the 
p-value of the difference in coefficients on the blockholder variable of interest in the low and high Securities Regulation 
subsamples. 
  
Panel A: Low Securities Regulation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Family/Mgmt control percentage  -0.044           
  (0.000)           
Family/Mgmt control GT med    -1.277         
    (0.005)         
Family/Mgmt GT med & largest BH      -1.450       
      (0.002)       
Family/Mgmt control GT 50%        -2.454     
        (0.000)     
Other BH control percentage          -0.001   
          (0.962)   
Other BH control GT 50%            0.117 
            (0.893) 
XLIST  9.463  9.644  8.464  9.565  9.660  9.659 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MSCI Membership  2.408  2.549  2.614  2.471  2.605  2.610 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln(Size)  3.118  3.163  3.145  3.153  3.231  3.228 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.132  -0.134  -0.135  -0.132  -0.134  -0.134 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Book-to-market  -0.661  -0.650  -0.494  -0.671  -0.634  -0.634 
  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.117)  (0.025)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Dividend Yield  -0.144  -0.149  -0.125  -0.138  -0.163  -0.163 
  (0.267)  (0.250)  (0.346)  (0.287)  (0.210)  (0.210) 
             
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 N  2693  2693  2629  2693  2693  2693 
Pseudo R
2   0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  
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Panel B: High Securities Regulation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Family/Mgmt control percentage  0.016           
  (0.211)           
Family/Mgmt control GT med    1.256         
    (0.027)         
Family/Mgmt GT med & largest BH      1.063       
      (0.064)       
Family/Mgmt control GT 50%        1.397     
        (0.072)     
Other BH control percentage          0.012   
          (0.395)   
Other BH control GT 50%            0.553 
            (0.620) 
XLIST  10.073  10.194  10.287  10.038  10.136  10.104 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MSCI Membership  5.822  5.774  5.279  5.917  5.706  5.699 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln(Size)  2.967  2.998  2.976  2.948  2.944  2.942 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.048  -0.049  -0.043  -0.047  -0.047  -0.047 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Book-to-market  -1.606  -1.627  -1.935  -1.572  -1.592  -1.593 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Dividend Yield  -0.080  -0.071  -0.061  -0.082  -0.101  -0.095 
  (0.550)  (0.597)  (0.651)  (0.537)  (0.450)  (0.480) 
             
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 




0.05  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.05 
 
P-value on blockholder coefficient 
difference between subsamples 
0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.703  0.650 
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Table 6 
U.S. Investment, Blockholder Control, and Legal Origin 
Tobit  regression  estimates  of  U.S.  Investment  scaled  by  float  on  blockholder  control  variables  of  interest  and 
controls estimated on subsamples of countries without and with an English Common Law legal origin as indicated in 
Table 2 of LLSV (1998). U.S. Investment is as of end-1997 and is defined the dollar value of U.S. investors’ 
portfolio  holdings  as  a  share  of  float,  where  float  is  defined  as  the  percentage  of  shares  not  held  by  large 
blockholders (as given by Worldscope’s Closely Held variable) multiplied by the market value of equity in billions 
of U.S. dollars.  Other model variables are described previously in Table 2.  Indicator variables for countries and 
industry groups (based on the classification of Campbell, 1996) are included but not reported. For each coefficient, 
the p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality with zero is reported in parentheses.  At the bottom of Panel B, we 
report the p-value of the difference in coefficients on the blockholder variable of interest in the non-English and 
English legal origin subsamples. 
Panel A: Not English Common Law 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Family/Mgmt control percentage  -0.040           
  (0.000)           
Family/Mgmt control GT med    -1.107         
    (0.022)         
Family/Mgmt GT med & largest BH      -1.300       
      (0.006)       
Family/Mgmt control GT 50%        -2.376     
        (0.000)     
Other BH control percentage          -0.006   
          (0.642)   
Other BH control GT 50%            -0.186 
            (0.839) 
XLIST  8.558  8.730  7.509  8.656  8.756  8.757 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MSCI Membership  2.760  2.873  2.615  2.806  2.900  2.911 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln(Size)  3.096  3.145  3.125  3.125  3.211  3.206 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.132  -0.133  -0.130  -0.131  -0.133  -0.133 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Book-to-market  -0.630  -0.622  -0.624  -0.644  -0.622  -0.619 
  (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.046)  (0.032)  (0.039)  (0.040) 
Dividend Yield  -0.131  -0.136  -0.046  -0.126  -0.148  -0.148 
  (0.321)  (0.302)  (0.731)  (0.338)  (0.262)  (0.260) 
             
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 N  2607  2607  2536  2607  2607  2607 
Pseudo R
2   0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  
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Panel B: English Common Law 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Family/Mgmt control percentage  0.009           
  (0.457)           
Family/Mgmt control GT med    0.905         
    (0.103)         
Family/Mgmt GT med & largest BH      0.710       
      (0.212)       
Family/Mgmt control GT 50%        1.085     
        (0.147)     
Other BH control percentage          0.018   
          (0.203)   
Other BH control GT 50%            0.908 
            (0.385) 
XLIST  10.866  10.931  10.895  10.842  10.912  10.893 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MSCI Membership  5.118  5.091  5.157  5.210  5.032  5.037 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln(Size)  3.012  3.038  3.019  3.003  3.000  2.999 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.051  -0.053  -0.055  -0.051  -0.050  -0.050 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Book-to-market  -1.626  -1.635  -1.740  -1.599  -1.623  -1.623 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Dividend Yield  -0.065  -0.057  -0.100  -0.067  -0.086  -0.0787 
  (0.620)  (0.661)  (0.455)  (0.607)  (0.514)  (0.554) 
             
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 N  1804  1804  1748  1804  1804  1804 
Pseudo R
2   0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05 
 
P-value on blockholder coefficient 
difference between subsamples 
0.001  0.004  0.004  0.000  0.560  0.465 
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 Table 7 
U.S. Investment, Blockholder Control, and Antidirector Rights 
Tobit regression estimates of U.S. Investment scaled by float estimated on subsamples of countries with low and 
high shareholder rights as measured by Antidirector Rights.  “Antidirector Rights” values range from 0 to 5 and are 
obtained from Table 2 of LLSV (1998). The “Low Antidirector Rights” subsample contains countries that score 
below 4 on the Antidirector Rights measure. U.S. Investment is as of end-1997 and is defined the dollar value of 
U.S. investors’ portfolio holdings as a share of float, where float is as defined in Table 2.  Other model variables are 
described previously in Table 2. Indicator variables for countries and industry groups (based on the classification of 
Campbell, 1996) are included but not reported. For each coefficient, the p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality 
with zero is reported in parentheses. At the bottom of Panel B, we report the p-value of the difference in coefficients 
on the blockholder variable of interest in the low and high Antidirector Rights subsamples. 
 
Panel A: Low Antidirector Rights 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Family/Mgmt control percentage  -0.040           
  (0.004)           
Family/Mgmt control GT med    -1.466         
    (0.047)         
Family/Mgmt GT med & largest BH      -1.613       
      (0.030)       
Family/Mgmt control GT 50%        -2.326     
        (0.005)     
Other BH control percentage          -0.031   
          (0.094)   
Other BH control GT 50%            -1.202 
            (0.368) 
XLIST  6.487  6.588  7.176  6.610  6.647  6.677 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
MSCI membership  3.198  3.399  2.957  3.249  3.499  3.530 
  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Ln(Size)  3.814  3.872  3.827  3.848  4.025  3.978 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.133  -0.135  -0.129  -0.134  -0.137  -0.136 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Book-to-market  -0.301  -0.299  -0.403  -0.316  -0.327  -0.308 
  (0.499)  (0.501)  (0.394)  (0.477)  (0.462)  (0.489) 
Dividend Yield  -0.245  -0.246  -0.166  -0.246  -0.266  -0.266 
  (0.189)  (0.189)  (0.394)  (0.187)  (0.155)  (0.155) 
             
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 N  1445  1445  1396  1445  1445  1445 
Pseudo R
2   0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  
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Panel B: High Antidirector Rights 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Family/Mgmt control percentage  -0.002           
  (0.802)           
Family/Mgmt control GT med    0.558         
    (0.163)         
Family/Mgmt GT med & largest BH      0.428       
      (0.303)       
Family/Mgmt control GT 50%        0.405     
        (0.503)     
Other BH control percentage          0.023   
          (0.034)   
Other BH control GT 50%            1.134 
            (0.156) 
XLIST  11.508  11.526  10.538  11.513  11.507  11.500 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
MSCI Membership  3.577  3.589  3.641  3.612  3.597  3.585 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln(Size)  2.690  2.719  2.724  2.695  2.694  2.688 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.088  -0.088  -0.091  -0.088  -0.087  -0.087 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Book-to-market  -1.577  -1.581  -1.560  -1.569  -1.564  -1.568 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Dividend Yield  -0.030  -0.022  -0.038  -0.028  -0.050  -0.038 
  (0.773)  (0.829)  (0.723)  (0.786)  (0.632)  (0.716) 
             
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 




0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06 
 
P-value on blockholder coefficient 
difference between subsamples 
0.031  0.016  0.017  0.009  0.194  0.126 
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Table 8 
U.S. Investment, Earnings Management, and Securities Regulation 
Tobit regression estimates of U.S. Investment scaled by float estimated on subsamples of countries with low and high 
scores on securities regulation.  “Securities Regulation” values potentially range from 0 to 1 and are defined as in Hail and 
Leuz (2004) as the average of the Disclosure Requirements, Liability Standards, and Public Enforcement indexes, which 
are  obtained  from  Table  2  of  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and  Shleifer  (2004).    The  “High  Securities  Regulation” 
subsample contains countries that score above our sample median of 0.58 on the Securities Regulation measure. U.S. 
Investment is as of end-1997 and is defined the dollar value of U.S. investors’ portfolio holdings as a share of float, where 
float is as defined in Table 2.  The first proxy for earnings management (EM) is based on Haw et al. (2004) and Wysocki 
(2004) and computed as the median magnitude of accruals relative to the cash flow from operations.  The second proxy is 
an aggregate earnings management score based on Leuz et al. (2003).  For the aggregate EM proxy, we compute three 
scores: (1) the magnitude of accruals relative to the operating cash flow, (2) the standard deviation of operating earnings 
over  the  standard  deviation  of  operating  cash  flows,  and  (3)  the  correlation  of  changes  in  accruals  and  changes  in 
operating cash flows. All variables are computed by firm from 1992 to 1997.  The scores are averaged for each firm and 
are ranked such that higher values indicate more earnings management.  Other model variables are described previously 
in Table 2. Indicator variables for countries and industry groups (based on the classification of Campbell, 1996) are 
included but not reported. For each coefficient, the p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality with zero is reported in 
parentheses. At the bottom of the table, we report the p-value of the difference in coefficients on the earnings management 
variable of interest in the low and high Securities Regulation subsamples. 
  
  Panel A:  
Low Securities Regulation 
Panel B:  
High Securities Regulation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Magnitude of Accruals  -3.517    0.3577   
  (0.000)    (0.733)   
Aggregate EM Score    -0.0013    0.0000 
    (0.001)    (0.980) 
XLIST  8.480  8.359  6.111  7.494 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.001) 
MSCI Membership  2.449  1.599  5.520  5.548 
  (0.010)  (0.107)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ln(Size)  3.634  3.876  2.960  2.845 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Leverage  -0.131  -0.141  -0.018  -0.011 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.553)  (0.723) 
Book-to-market  0.036  -0.023  -2.835  -2.783 
  (0.955)  (0.973)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Dividend Yield  -0.380  -0.187  0.152  0.159 
  (0.088)  (0.417)  (0.501)  (0.484) 
         
Industry Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 N  1204  1115  786  732 
Pseudo R
2   0.09  0.09  0.07  0.07 
P-value on EM coefficient difference 
between low and high subsamples 




  Table 9 
Robustness Tests 
The table reports coefficients on Family/Mgmt (F/M) control percentage and on an indicator variable for Family/Mgmt control percentage greater than 50% for a 
series of regression models that contain all control variables found in the base case models estimated in Tables 2 through 7, and feature one or more additional 
variables for robustness.  Liquidity refers to the percentage of trading days in the 1997 calendar year in which the stock had zero return for the day – this measure 
is computed only for firms with price data reported for at least 100 trading days in 1997.  Momentum refers to the 12 month buy-and-hold stock return over the 
period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997, winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percent levels.  In Panel A, the dependent variable is U.S. Investment scaled by float, 
consistent with all prior reported regressions.  In Panel B, the dependent variable is U.S. Investment scaled by total market capitalization, and float in U.S. dollars 
is included as an additional right hand side variable. The models are separately estimated for subsamples of countries with low and high scores on Disclosure 
Requirements and on Securities Regulation as described in Tables 4 and 5.  For each coefficient, the p-value of the two-tailed t-test of equality with zero is 
reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A:  Dependent variable is U.S. Investment as a percentage of float 




























Includes liquidity and momentum variables  -0.025  -1.835  -0.027  -1.941  0.011  1.132  0.018  1.523 
  (0.018)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.381)  (0.139)  (0.158)  (0.056) 
Number of observations  2465  2465  2526  2526  1655  1655  1594  1594 
 
Panel B:  Dependent variable is U.S. Investment as a percentage of equity market capitalization 




























Base case model  -0.030  -1.856  -0.032  -1.900  -0.005  -0.093  -0.001  0.119 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.430)  (0.825)  (0.858)  (0.784) 
Number of observations  2625  2625  2691  2691  1778  1778  1712  1712 
                 
Includes liquidity and momentum variables  -0.026  -1.713  -0.027  -1.723  -0.002  0.065  0.001  0.212 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.730)  (0.881)  (0.936)  (0.633) 
Number of observations  2465  2465  2526  2526  1655  1655  1594  1594 
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